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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Appellants Alpine Coal Co., Inc. and AGTC, Inc.'s
("A&A" or "A&A aka Viron") interlocutory appeal of the District Court's March 1, 2010
Order of Partial Summary Judgment in Favor ofCoBon Energy, LLC ("CoBon") and Order
of Dismissal With Prejudice in Favor of Counter defendants ("3/1/10 Order", Exh. A; R.
5531-21), enforcing an integrated and unambiguous June 28,2000 Settlement Agreement and
Release ("Release", Exh. B;R. 1131-26). See Utah R.App.P. 5 andU.C.A. § 78A-4-1030).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in considering, but disregarding as inadmissible,

A&A's voluminous parol evidence concerning the scope and legal effect of the Release,
where the Release contained "unambiguous" terms and was "integrated" and "enforceable"
(3/1/10 Order, Fdg \ 9, Cnclffif3, 6, 10, Exh. A)?
2.

Did the District Court (via 3/1/10 Order) err in refusing to rewrite, and in

enforcing as written, the Release to bar A&A's counterclaims under the December 5,1996
"Consulting Agreement", Exh. C R. 1179-1), where "[t]he scope and performance of the
Consulting Agreement were squarely implicated in the [underlying] Civil Action" and such
counterclaims were within the plain scope of and discharged by the Release, and where it
concluded that "no genuine issue of material fact would prevent this Court from deciding this
matter [and] that the Court may interpret the terms of the Release, which are unambiguous
. . . as a matter of law" {Id., Cncl \ 10)?

-1-

3.

Did the District Court (via its 3/1/10 Order) err in rejecting A&A's "non-

accrual of future claims" argument, ruling, inter alia, that "[t]he scope and performance of
the Consulting Agreement were squarely implicated in the Civil Action and the contingency
payments to be made in the future under the Consulting Agreement were also in play in the
Civil Action" and that "[t]here is no basis to limit the scope of the Release" (Id, Fdgffl[7,
9, Cncl ^l93;see

also Cnclffif4-5)?

Standard of Review. Each issue is reviewed for correctness.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of Case. This action arises out of A&A's breach of a December 5, 1996
"Consulting Agreement55 (cited as "CA"; Exh. C; R. 1180-71) between CoBon and A&A
aka Viron, and A&A aka Viron5 s execution of a June 28, 2000 Release, whereby A&A
released all of their claims, which have now been asserted herein as counterclaims, in
consideration of the settlement of multiple disputes and their retention of $180,000 (paid
under protest) and receipt of an additional $60,000. In October 2006, CoBon filed this
action, seeking repayment of substantial monies loaned/advanced to and converted by A&A,
and damages in excess of $60 million based on A&A's breach of the Consulting Agreement.
(Cmplt.,R.0027-l). 1

1

In its 11/24/08 Amd. Cmplt. R. 2101-2078), CoBon seeks damages for A&A's
failed development efforts; conversions via unlawful kickbacks and self dealing;
misrepresentations as to their engineering "licensure55; and other misconduct. At a 9/1/10
hearing for payment of CoBon5s attorneys5 fees, A&A stated they are out of business
and/or bankrupt. Appellees believe A&A have hidden/wasted millions in unpaid loans
-2-

For a term of "eleven years" (for the period of available LR.C.§ 29 tax credits) and
"at [their] own expense", A&A agreed, inter alia, to provide consultation and project
development assistance regarding the identification, evaluation, development, construction
and operation of "briquette manufacturing facilities" capable of producing qualifying coal
briquettes utilizing a sublicensed coal technology, and the marketing of the briquettes and
facilities to third party purchasers. (CA,ffif1.0, 1.2, 6.0; Exh. C). Notably, the scope of
A&A's services expressly included:
identification, evaluation and obtaining of suitable raw material resources [i.e., coal
fines],... the construction and management of an adequate briquette plant and operation,
. . . respecting all aspects of plant operation.
(Id.,ffif1.2,1.0, 5.0 (emphasis added)).2 The argument that A&A5s contractual duties only
required they "quickly develop and sell" facilities is thus a gross oversimplification. (Aplt.
Brief, 8).
Subject to A&A's satisfaction of the conditions of the Consulting Agreement,
including obtaining "suitable raw material resources" (i.e., start up coal fines), CoBon agreed
to pay a consulting fee (i.e., 30% of specifically defined and qualified proceeds) to A&A.
(Id., Tf 2.0). A&A failed and refused to satisfy the conditions of the Consulting Agreement

by, or converted property of, CoBon, and that they come to this Court with unclean hands.
2

A&A's refusal to obtain "suitable raw materials" and entitlement to payment
under the Consulting Agreement were central to the Release and related Civil Action.
-3-

and never earned any fees.3 Efforts to generate qualifying revenue were unsuccessful due
to A&A's breaches resulting in substantial damages to CoBon. (See n.3, supra).
A&A initially asserted counterclaims only against CoBon for consulting fees, and later
asserted amended counterclaims against CoBon5s alleged members and/or affiliates (i.e.,
"Counterdefendants").
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition. In a January 11, 2010 bench ruling
(Hearing Tscpt. ("Tscpt"), R. 6544-6411), the District Court granted CoBon's Motion for

3

Though unabashedly claiming they are owed some $20 million in fees, A&A5s
calculation is based on CoBon's receipt of exempted sublicensing and unrelated revenues,
which were defined as falling outside the scope of revenue from which fees could be
assessed. A&A admit they were not even retained for CoBon's sublicensing activities.
Q: The purpose for your being engaged . . . in this consulting agreement was to help
develop the projects, putting together all the aspects that would be required in
developing a successful manufacturing facility, right, using the coal technology?
A: Yes. . ..
Q: [The] distinction I'm making is that you weren't being retained under this
agreement to go out and sell sublicenses to technology?
A: No.
(Exh. F - Rodak Depo. Vol. 2, 401-07). The Consulting Agreement provides: "Nothing
herein shall be construed as granting A&A any interest in or a right to receive any portion
of the Sublicense Royalty Fee or Binder Fee, except as expressly provided herein.55 (CA, «f
3.0). Paragraph 3.0 states that only in the event CoBon "successfully developed and
marketed" any qualifying briquette facility to a third party and negotiated 1) a Sublicense
Royalty Fee payment "for an amount greater than $3.00 per ton" or 2) a Binder Fee
payment at a price greater than the actual cost of the binder plus 20%, could A&A receive
30% of the profit derived. Because CoBon never negotiated any Fees which qualified for
commissions, A&A would not be entitled to a recovery even if they had not waived and
released their claims. (S. Nash Deck ^ 10 a), o)) R. 4441-33). See MSJ Opp. Memo
analysis, Sec. V, n.40 R. 4351-45) and Sec. F, R. 4323-19).
-4-

Partial Summary Judgment Re: Release ("Motion Re:

Release") R. 1212-1063

(Mot/Memo), 2245-2102 (Reply), 5501-5312 (Supp Memo)) and Counterdefendants'
Motions to Dismiss Amd. Counterclaim ("Motion to Dismiss"). R. 3176-67, 3156-2831
(Mot/Memo), 3613-3405 (Reply)). See 3/1/10 Order, Exh. A.4
Significantly, before concluding A&A's counterclaims were barred by the Release,
however, the Court carefully "reviewed the pleadings and papers filed" (over 4,000 pages)
and "received extensive oral arguments of counsel" (3-4 hrs). (3/1/10 Order, Intro ^ 2).
Thus, the District Court carefully considered, but rejected as inadmissible, A&A's
voluminous submission of parol evidence (and argument that such created genuine issues of
material fact), ruling the Release contained "plain and unambiguous" terms, was "integrated"
and "enforceable" and, importantly, that:
There is no basis to limit the plain scope of the Release. The interpretation of the terms
of the Release or readings suggested by Defendants are [sic] strained and would require
the Court to ignore the plain meaning of the contract. Such are
unsupported and contrary to and ignore the plain meaning of the Release.
(3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 9, Cnclffif3, 6, 10).5

4

A&A's statement that they "were not provided the opportunity to object" to the
3/1/10 Order (Aplt. Brief, 7), and suggestion the District Court erred in adopting
Appellees' proposed findings and conclusions, are untrue. Rather, A&A's objections
were rejected as untimely and as not conforming with the bench ruling. (4/21/10 Ruling,
R. 6067-65; State v. All Real Property, 2001 UT App. 361 at ^ 11 ("court may ask
counsel to submit findings to aid the court"). See Tscpt. 128, R. 6413.
5

Appellees strongly objected to A&A's refusal to admit the "straightforward"
facts regarding the Release and their attempts to divert the District Court's attention to
inadmissible parol evidence. (Tscpt., 50, R. 6554-6411) (since "the release is an
-5-

The District Court found these central material facts to be undisputed:
a) A&A were alternatively known as Viron or Viron Energy (collectively, "Viron") at
all material times (Facts % 2; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 2);
b) A&A filed a verified Civil Action (in PA) ("Civil Action", Exh. D; R. 1162-33),
asserting claims based on an attached copy of the parties' May 8, 1998 Letter of
Understanding ("5/8/98 LOU", Exh. E; R. 1169-4)6, which 5/8/98 LOU expressly
confirmed the existence of, and reservation of all rights respecting, a dispute between
CoBon and A&A regarding A&A's non performance and payment under the
Consulting Agreement (Facts % 7; 3/1/10 Order, Fdgffij7, 4, Cncl ffif 3-5);
c) On 6/28/00, A&A aka Viron settled the Civil Action by executing a broad
"integrated" and "enforceable" Release discharging, inter alia, CoBon and
Counterdefendants from claims, including any under the Consulting Agreement (Facts
ffij 8-10; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 8-9, Cnclffif2-3); and
d) A&A aka Viron specifically admitted under oath7 that the scope of claims discharged
under the Release includes each of their counterclaims filed herein (Facts %% 11-13;
3/1/10 Order, Fdgffi[7-9,Cnclffif3-5).
The District Court held "no genuine issue of material fact would prevent the Court from
deciding this matter [and] the Court may interpret the terms of the Release, which are
unambiguous . . . as a matter of law." (3/1/10 Order, Cncl •fl 10). It enforced the Release
consistent with A&A's admissions regarding the scope of discharged claims.

integrated agreement", [the thousands of pages of] "parol evidence that's been brought in
to counter it is inadmissible [and] really doesn't have application here today/'). See also
CoBon Reply Memo, Sec. A-C and n.2-7; R. 2236-27; Counterdefendants Reply Memo,
Sec. B and n.6-7,R. 3599-97.
6

Legible unsigned and less legible signed copies, R. 1169-4) are attached.

7

Messrs. Rodak (Alpine' principal) and Visovsky's (AGTC's principal)
depositions admissions are respectively attached as Exh. F, R. 1124-04; 1206,2145-22,
2195, 4409, 5459-34, 5490) and Exh G, R. 1102-1083; 2120-07, 2365, 5476-60).
-6-

The District Court found these central material facts to be undisputed:
a) A&A were alternatively known as Viron or Viron Energy (collectively, "Viron") at
all material times (Facts pp. 7-9; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 2);
b) A&A filed a verified Civil Action (in PA) ("Civil Action", Exh. D; R. 1162-33),
asserting claims based on an attached copy of the parties' May 8, 1998 Letter of
Understanding ("5/8/98 LOU", Exh, E; R. 1169-4)6, which 5/8/98 LOU expressly
confirmed the existence of, and reservation of all rights respecting, a dispute between
CoBon and A&A regarding A&A's non performance and payment under the
Consulting Agreement (Facts pp. 1345; 3/1/10 Order, Fdgffi[7,4, Cncl ffij 3-5);
c) On 6/28/00, A&A aka Viron settled the Civil Action by executing a broad
"integrated" and "enforceable" Release discharging, inter alia, CoBon and
Counterdefendants from claims, including any under the Consulting Agreement (Facts
pp. 15-16; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg K 8-9, Cncl 1fl[ 2-3); and
d) A&A aka Viron specifically admitted under oath7 that the scope of claims discharged
under the Release includes each of their counterclaims filed herein (Facts pp. 17-18;
3/1/10 Order, Fdg ^[7-9, Cncl | f 3-5).
The District Court held "no genuine issue of material fact would prevent the Court from
deciding this matter [and] the Court may interpret the terms of the Release, which are
unambiguous . , . as a matter of law." (3/1/10 Order, Cncl \ 10). It enforced the Release
consistent with A&A's admissions regarding the scope of discharged claims.

integrated agreement", [the thousands of pages of] "parol evidence that's been brought in
to counter it is inadmissible [and] really doesn't have application here today."). See also
CoBon Reply Memo, Sec. A-C and n.2-7; R. 2236-27; Counterdefendants Reply Memo,
Sec. B and n.6-7, R. 3599-97.
6

Legible unsigned and less legible signed copies, R. 1169-4) are attached.

7

Messrs. Rodak (Alpine' principal) and Visovsky's (AGTC's principal)
depositions admissions are respectively attached as Exh. F, R. 1124-04; 1206, 2145-22,
2195, 4409, 5459-34, 5490) and Exh G, R 1102-1083; 2120-07, 2365, 5476-60).
-6-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Consulting Agreement. On December 5, 1996, CoBon entered into a Consulting
Agreement with A&A, whereby for an eleven year term, A&A agreed "at [their] own
expense55 to provide consultation and project development assistance regarding the
identification, evaluation, development, construction and operation of "briquette
manufacturing facilities55 and the marketing of the coal briquettes and facilities to third party
purchasers. The "necessary and reasonable consultation] and assistance55 for such facilities,
specifically included the
identification, evaluation and obtaining of suitable raw material resources, the selection
of suitable briquette facility site locations, the construction and management of an
adequate briquette plant and operation, the negotiation and acquisition of coal product
sales contracts, the securing of site permits and confirmation of regulatory compliance
respecting all aspects of plant operation.
(CA, ffif 1.0, 1.2, 2.4 (emphasis added), Exh C; Rodak Depo. Vol. 2 at 324-25, Exh. F;
Visovsky Depo. Vol. 1 at 57-9, Exh. G (A&A was "an acronym to describe both [Alpine and
AGTC]55 in the Consulting Agreement and subsequent communications)).

Clearly,

"obtaining suitable raw materials55 and assisting with plant "operation55 for the term of eleven
years were expressly contemplated.
A&A's "Interchangeable"Names.

At material times and in attempting to provide

services under the Consulting Agreement, A&A admittedly were also variously known as
"Viron Energy55 or "Viron55, an unregistered partnership or joint venture name selected by

-7-

Rodak and Visovsky and under which A&A also did business.8 A&A have also admitted
that, throughout the parties' dealings "anytime there's a reference to Viron . . . it would be
to A&A" and "there is [no] other purpose than to substitute the name Viron [for A&A]."
A&A farther admitted: Viron and A&A are simply "interchangeable wordfs]". As Viron
Energy was "nothing more than A&A", whose purpose it was "to perform the duties and
obligations of the Consulting Agreement", Viron Energy was (and remains) the dba or
tradename of Alpine and AGTC. The name "Viron [was used] exclusively for the CoBon
[Consulting] Agreement." "A&A and Viron were interchangeable names to describe . . .
Alpine and AGTC for purposes of the consulting agreement." (Exh. F - Rodak Depo. Vol
3 at 567, Vol. 4 at 612-4, Vol. 5 at 778-80? 820; Vol. 6 at 1007, 1033, 1047, 1067-9, 1170
and Exh. G - Visovsky Depo. Vol. 5 at 1058-9 (emphasis added); Exh. H - Viron 3/27/98
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In a May 30, 2007 response to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents - Interrogatory No. 4, A&A admitted:
Interrogatory No. 4: Identify Viron Energy.
Response: Viron Energy was the "A&A" referred to in the subject Consulting
Agreement. It was a name for the joint venture/partnership between Alpine Coal
Company, Inc., ("Alpine") and AGTC, Inc., ("AGTC") that entered into and
performed the Consulting Agreement... .
(R. 1207). See also R. 1081-66 - Exh 81 (AGTC 1/31/97 Letter (presenting "proposal
[from] A&A (henceforth known as Viron Energy)", showing dual nature of Viron)); Exh.
247 (AGTC 5/12/98 Letter (shows dba status and explains Viron "was solely formed to
make [A&A's] relationship easy for CoBon. [TJhere is absolutely no difference in our
dealings with CoBon.")); and Exh. 181 (Viron/Rodak 12/2/99 Letter ("CoBon entered
into a consulting agreement with [A&A] subsequently known as Viron")).
-8-

Letter (admitting "[A&A] hereinafter referred to as Viron Energy, are party to [the]
Consulting Agreement", A&A state "[a]s per the agreement, Viron Energy shall devote such
consulting time and resources [to] obtain[] suitable raw material resources").
Dispute Under the Consulting Agreement

Following execution of the Consulting

Agreement, and by way of background, a dispute9 arose between CoBon and A&A aka Viron
respecting A&A's failure and/or refusal to provide "suitable raw materials" for the critical
June 1998 deadline for start up "operations" at the Robena project as required by the
Consulting Agreement. (Facts p. 7). By letter dated 3/27/98, Exh. H, A&A aka Viron
demanded that an additional monthly fee be paid by CoBon to A&A aka Viron (in excess of
the fee agreed in the Consulting Agreement) for obtaining such raw materials. (S. Nash
Affid. ffi[ 6-7, R. 1230-13; RodakDepo. Vol. 4 at 1066, 1100-1, Exh. F; Visovsky Depo.

9

In argument, A&A admitted the existence of a Consulting Agreement "dispute":

Court:

[What] I heard [CoBon] saying was, yes, there was a dispute under the
original consulting agreement as to whether or not finding these raw
materials was within or without the scope of [A&A's] obligations.
Savage: Right.
Court: [They] say, we think you ought to do it because you agreed to.
Savage: Right.
Court: So that was - that was a dispute.
Savage: Right.
(Tscpt. 57-8, R. 6484-3 (bold added); see also n.20, infra). K8ih admitted the
"disagreement" regarding obtaining "suitable fines" and other services, resulting in
CoBon's "reservation" of all rights under the Consulting Agreement as stated in the
5/8/98 LOU, and reiterated in the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding. (Memo of Supp Facts
("Supp Memo"), R. 5501-5312, Sec. A, pp. 6-8; Omnibus Factsffif3-4, R. 3518-3405
andffif3-5, R. 2371-2340).
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Vol. 4 at 820-1, 826-7, Exh. G; R. 2187-6).
In an April 10,1998 letter response to A&A, CoBon, through its subsidiary Robena,
reiterated concern regarding A&A's failure to obtain suitable raw materials as required by
the Consulting Agreement and stated respecting the Robena project:
[CoBon] has a consulting agreement in place with [A&A], which for all intents and
purposes already covers what I believe is the scope of Viron's proposal. . . . [W]hy is
CoBon receiving a proposal from [Viron] when CoBon already has executed [a
Consulting] Agreement for the necessary and reasonable consulting services and
assistance with respect to the obtaining of suitable raw material resources including coal
fines, etc. for this Project[?] It makes no sense to me . . . for CoBon to pay for such
services twice if that is what you are proposing. The primary motivation for the
Agreement was to eliminate the need for third party brokers and to rely on your expertise
and relationships in identifying and obtaining the appropriate resources to the Project.
[It] is critical that we move forward with the securing of raw material resources (clean
coal fines) for the startup procedure and short term operation .. . of the Plant. . . . It is
this very consultation and due diligence relating to securing suitable raw materials that
I am expecting you to be providing incident to the [Consulting] Agreement. This work
needs to be completed as soon as possible, given the pending construction deadline and
in-service deadline for the Project. . . .
CoBon expects that you will perform all of your obligations under the [Consulting]
Agreement. This includes . . . acquisition of suitable raw materials, including the
identification of such suitable resources . . . and the delivery of such raw materials
pertaining to the Project.
[When] this Project was developed, you were contracted to assist and consult with
respect to securing raw material sources; evaluating raw material quality . . . . Your
compensation for such in-house services is considerable
CoBon contracted with you
and agreed to pay you based upon a percentage of revenues derived from the Project for
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In an April 10, 1998 letter to CoBon, Exh. I, A&A aka Viron also threatened to
"ride into the sunsef' (i.e., abandon all work) if the additional monthly fee was not paid,
and framed the dispute by stating they "could debate . . . ad infinitum" whether "the
services proposed are within the scope of the work" under the Consulting Agreement.
-10-

such services.
(4/10/98 Letter, R. 1074-1, Exh. J (emphasis added)).11
CoBon's Reservations ofAll Rights. After further discussion and under economic
duress, CoBon and A&A aka Viron entered the 5/8/98 LOU, temporarily resolving the
impasse, while reserving all claims. Notably, through a signed "Acknowledgment and
Consent" thereto, A&A aka Viron confirmed both the nature of the parties5 perfomiance and
payment disputes and CoBon's duties. In the 5/8/98 LOU, CoBon agreed with reservation
to meet A&A's payment demands, stating (emphasis added):
[As] indicated in my letter dated April 10,1998, [A&A] are responsible for assisting
CoBon in obtaining suitable coal fines relating to the Project, including such fines as may
be required in the start up and pre-wash plant construction time frame. You have
nevertheless advised me that you are only willing to assist CoBon in this regard if Viron
. . . is retained to assist with the identification, evaluation and obtaining of such raw
materials.
As you know, this Project is in the twelfth hour and literally millions have been
invested by CoBon and Providian. As previously indicated, CoBon is frustrated that
identifying and obtaining a suitable short term raw material supply has even become a
problem. Nevertheless, CoBon is understandably more concerned that if suitable coal
fines are not located immediately, the Project will be in jeopardy and may fail altogether.
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As further background, despite CoBon's 4/10/98 "performance" demand, and in
the twelfth hour and under circumstances constituting economic duress, A&A continued
to refuse to provide the raw materials. By an April 16, 1998 Memo, A&A confirmed a
program for "sourcing fines", but only under a threat to withhold critical services:
[A&A] would receive a monthly retainer of $15,000 ($7,500 e a c h ) . . . . [The]
aforementioned program will insure the Robena Project with our 100% availability
and commitment through the critical next few months . . . .
(4/16/98 Memo, R. 2176; S. Nash Affid. If 9, R. 1230-13).
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As a result of this economic hardship, and without waiving any of its rights under
CoBon's November 1. 1996 Consulting Agreement with [A&A], CoBon has decided to
move forward in working with you to solve this urgent problem. Inasmuch as CoBon has
previously made advanced distributions to [A&A] incident to this Project, and while
reserving the right to treat any fees paid by the Project to Viron hereafter relating to
obtaining suitable raw materials as advancements or as CoBon may otherwise deem
appropriate, CoBon agrees to work with Viron . . . .
(5/8/98 LOU, Exh. E). Thus, in the 5/8/98 LOU, CoBon expressly reserved all rights under
the Consulting Agreement (i.e., including for A&A's alleged breaches thereof).
After the 5/8/98 LOU was signed and in a May 12, 1998 Fax Message to CoBon,
AGTC attempted to take issue with CoBon's assertion of "economic hardship" in the 5/8/98
LOU, demanding CoBon "retract it in writing". A&A copied counsel on the letter. (R.
2167-66). In a May 12, 1998 letter to CoBon, Alpine also took belated exception to the
5/8/98 LOU, even though both had expressly "consented" to the 5/8/98 LOU. (R. 2164-3).
In a separate May 13,1998 faxed handwritten letter, A&A attempted to modify their position
in the 5/8/98 LOU regarding their breach of the Consulting Agreement. A&A proposed that
"all parties" to the Consulting Agreement will "reserve all rights contained therein". (R.
2161-55).
Despite their demand for a written "retraction", A&A admit that CoBon refused and
never retracted the 5/8/98 LOU. (See n.47, infra). In fact, CoBon reiterated its "reservation
of rights" in a May 18, 1998 Letter of Understanding (signed May 19. 1998) ("5/19/98
Letter of Understanding"), Exh. K. Stating it was "a follow up to [the parties' prior]
discussions", CoBon wrote:
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[Robena] will hereafter enter into a consulting agreement for Viron's reasonable and
necessary assistance and consultation in identifying, evaluating, and obtaining raw
material resources suitable for the Project....
As discussed, and notwithstanding your May 13, 1998 letter, [CoBon] reserves its
rights under [the] Consulting Agreement with [A&A] regarding the scope of consulting
services to be provided thereunder relative to the Project.
(Id., Exh. K, R. 2150-49).12 The referenced "May 13, 1998 letter" is A&A's foregoing
handwritten letter, whereby they sought to alter the scope of reserved rights. A&A
"acknowledged and consented5' to the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding, which did not
modify, supercede or otherwise diminish the "acknowledged and consented" to 5/8/98 LOU.
The 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding merely served to ratify the reservations and agreements
acknowledged by A&A aka Viron in the 5/8/98 LOU, "notwithstanding [AGTC's] May 13,
1998 letter". {See 3/1/10 Order, Fdg \ 5) ("the subsequent [5/19/98 Letter of Understanding]
and 7/1/98 Letter Agreement do not relevantly change the fundamental agreement that was
specified in the 5/8/98 LOU").
The Civil Action. Through Robena, CoBon's wholly owned sub-subsidiary, and
pursuant to the 5/8/98 LOU, CoBon caused a $15,000 per month fee to be paid to A&A aka
Viron for 12 months, but did not complete the payments called for in the 5/8/98 LOU. (Civil

12

CoBon never retracted its "economic hardship" reference or reservation of all
rights in the 5/8/98 LOU. Rather, it required A&A to reacknowledge its prior reservation
to invalidate any concern raised by A&A's May 13, 1998 letter. A&A did not reserve any
rights under the 5/8/98 LOU or the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding.
-13-

Action, Exh. D; S. Nash Affid. f 1l). 13 Due to non-payment and on November 24, 1999,
A&A aka Viron filed a Pennsylvania Civil Action for monies allegedly owed pursuant to the
5/8/98 LOU (i.e., attached to and incorporated in the "verified" complaint). (Exh. D). The
"verified" Complaint describes, alleges and admits the 5/8/98 LOU as the basis for the Civil
Action and repeatedly refers to CoBon, and its obligations:
The Defendant entered into a Letter of Understanding ("LOU") with [A&A aka Viron]
on May 8, 1998 through its agent CoBon Energy, LLC . . . whereby Plaintiff would be
paid a consulting fee . . . for its assistance in identifying, evaluating and obtaining
suitable coal fines to be purchased by CoBon. or its assigns. A [copy is] attached hereto
and made part hereof by reference.
(Verified Complaint ^ 3, R. 1161-57; Exh. D (emphasis added)). The Civil Action named
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In the 5/8/98 LOU (reiterated in the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding), CoBon
promised and was obligated "to take steps... to obtain Robena's consent to the proposed
terms of the consulting agreement [i.e., the "7/1/98 Letter Agreement" (Exh. L)] and
coordinate with Robena for . . . an advance consulting fee payment in the initial amount
of $15,000". CoBon thereby assumed an obligation regarding Robena's execution of the
7/1/98 Letter Agreement, which was drafted and signed by Steve Nash, as the Manager of
CoBon, which was the Manager of Synfuel #2, which was an owner and the General
Partner of Robena, LP (i.e., owner of Robena) and manager of Robena. Consistent with
this background, the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement specifically states:
This letter is a follow up to various prior communications with [Viron] . . . . Robena .
.. retains Viron's reasonable and necessary assistance and consultation in identifying,
evaluating, and obtaining raw material resources suitable for the Project....
(Exh. L, R. 2147). It references the parties' "various prior communications" and relies
upon CoBon's prior definition of the "Project" in the 5/8/98 LOU. It does not however,
retract the 5/8/98 LOU or CoBon's reservation of all rights thereunder. Nor does it
replace or supercede the terms of the 5/8/98 LOU. Rather, as stated, it is a "follow up"
thereto. The 7/1/98 Letter Agreement completed CoBon's obligation to cause Robena's
payments under the 5/8/98 LOU. The 5/8/98 LOU and 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding
both remained operable and enforceable. (See n.38, 45 and 47, infra, and Exh. M).
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Robena, LLC ("Robena") an entity owned, maintained and/or managed by CoBon at all
material times, through CoBon's wholly owned subsidiary, CoBon Synfuel #2, LLC
("Synfuel #2"), which CoBon has managed since its inception. (S. Nash Affid.ffif5,12-13;
K. Nash Affid. ffif 11, 13-14, R. 754-676, and n.13, supra).
The Release. On June 28, 2000, A&A aka Viron entered the Release, whereby
Robena and A&A aka Viron, as Parties, settled the Civil Action and released, as "Released
Parties", inter alia, the "Parties" (i.e., each other) and their
past, present or future parent or affiliated companies, and/or entities, and each of their
respective past, present or future predecessors, successors, . . shareholders, partners,
directors, attorneys, officers, . . . servants, employees, agents, managers, members and
assigns, including, without limitation, . . . Robena LP, . . . CoBon Synfuel #2, LLC
CoBon Energy, LLC, Steven R. Nash. Robert N a s h , . . . .
(Release, \ 1, Exh. B (emphasis added); S. Nash Affid. \ 14).14
Significantly, "in consideration o f a $60,000 payment and the settlement of the
multiple disputed "claims, counterclaims and disputes" that had arisen between the parties,
"including, without limitation, [the Civil Action]", the parties agreed that A&A aka Viron
Energy forever discharged and released the "Released Parties" and "their respective heirs,
administrators, agents and assigns":
from any and all claims, counterclaims, debts, actions, judgments, and causes of action
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Kelly Nash (CoBon, Synfuel #2 and/or Robena's attorney, officer, servant,
employee, agent and/or member) and Anton Tone (CoBon and Robena's officer, servant,
employee, agent and/or member) are plainly and admittedly among those identified as
Released Parties. (K. Nash Affid. ffif 11-18, R. 754-676; Rodak Depo. Vol. 1 135-7, Vol.
2 at 326, Vol. 7 at 1288-91, Exh. F; Visovsky Depo. Vol. 5 at 1137, Exh. G).
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which relate to or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by
Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the "Project") including, without
limitation, claims asserted in, or that could have been asserted in, the Civil Action.
(Release, f 1, Exh. B (emphasis added)).
Rodak (Alpine), for A&A aka Viron, admitted he executed the Release:
a) "as a partner of Viron Energy", "with the consent of Rick Visovsky (AGTC)55 and
"representing [Visovsky5s] interests as well55. (Rodak Depo. Vol. 7 at 1354, Exh. F;
Visovsky Depo. Vol. 5 at 1016-7, Exh. G).
b) intending "[the Release] to be binding on [Rodak] and Rick55, to be "binding on
Viron55 and to be "binding on A&A (Alpine and AGTC)55. (Rodak Depo. Vol. 7 at
1355, Exh. F).
c) having "received a payment of $60,000.00 in consideration for the release . . .
provided in [the Release]55, which was "split55 with Visovsky (Visovsky "received
$30,00055). (Id; Visovsky Depo. Vol. 5 at 1017-8, Exh. G).
d) "voluntar[il]y55 and not "under any kind of compulsion or duress55. (Rodak Depo. Vol.
7 at 1356, Exh. F).
e) "fully educated on what the terms of [Release] were when [he] signed it as to
understand what [he'd] be bound to do and what [he5d] receive in exchange.55 (Id).
f) intending "to settle and resolve all disputes and claims that existed between [Alpine
and AGTC dba Viron Energy] and the other parties to the [Release]5' (as a result, "the
case was dismissed55). (Id.; Visovsky Depo. Vol. 5 at 1018, Exh. G).15
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A&A aka Viron agreed i) the "Release shall be binding upon and shall inure to
the benefit of the Parties hereto55 (Release, f 4, Exh. B), ii) the "Release represents the
entire understanding of the Parties hereto and supersedes all prior written or oral
agreements, representations or understandings, if any, relating to the subject matter
hereof5 (id., % 7), hi) they had "read this Settlement and Release and fully understand^
the . . . terms contained herein, and [have] had the advice of counsel pertaining thereto,
prior to the time of execution55 (id., \ 12), and iv) a party thereto (i.e., CoBon) was
entitled to "specific performance of the provisions of the [Release]55 and "the recovery of
damages55 incurred by reason of any breach thereof (Id, *f 11).
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Admitted Scope of Release. Regarding the scope of released claims, Rodak admitted
"the claims that [A&A are] asserting in this case against CoBon Energy relat[e] to or aris[e]
out of... consulting services that [A&A] performed regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel
Plant5' and "with respect to the position that [A&A] are asserting as a party in this case, all
of [A&A's] claims arise out of and will be defined by this consulting agreement55. (Exh. F Rodak Depo. Vol. 7 at 1361-2 (emphasis added)).
In further regard to the scope of released claims, Visovsky testified that "the three
projects [concerning which A&A] have asserted claims against [CoBon] are Pace, PBS and
Robena55, that "those are the three projects that [A&A] believe CoBon has received money
from55, and that "each of these projects are related to the consulting services [A&A] agreed
to provide under the consulting agreement55. (Exh. G - Visovsky Depo. Vol. 4 at 708-9
(emphasis added)). Referring to A&A5s claim to a 30% share of any CoBon revenues
relating to the Pace, PBS and Robena projects, he testified that:
for purposes of [A&A5 s] analysis and claim of [A&A5 s] entitlements for compensation
under the consulting agreement, all of the projects worked on [or] developed by CoBon
. . . which produced any revenue are all related together under the consulting agreement

(Id, Vol. 3 at 617-19).
A&A aka Viron also admit to having advanced herein a legal claim or theory that
"[A&A] have a right to a share5' of "any compensation that CoBon received or income that
CoBon received from Pace [and the PB S or Robena projects]55 because "[such compensation
is] related to the consulting agreement.55

(Id., Vol. 4 at 709-10 (emphasis added)).
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Importantly, A&A similarly admit that "A&A's services in connection with the Pace [and
the PBS and Robena] projects] arise out of and relate to the CoBon consulting agreement/'
(Id., Vol. 4 at 710-11 (emphasis added)).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Parol Evidence Is Inadmissible to Contradict Plain Terms of the Release. A&A

attempt to avoid the legal effect of the unambiguous and integrated Release
1) by summarily contending the Civil Action mistakenly attached the 5/8/98 LOU (and
related "dispute" under the Consulting Agreement) (Exh. E), and stating what A&A
aka Viron "really intended'5 to attach was the subsequent, related 7/1/98 Letter
Agreement (Exh. L), between Robena and A&A aka Viron, which is not even
mentioned in the "verified" Complaint therein, and
2) by summarily arguing the scope of the Release was therefor limited to only a single
$60,000 fee dispute under the unattached 7/1/98 Letter Agreement.
In doing so, A&A "contradict*5 the stated basis for the Civil Action (i.e., and the "disputes"
thereunder) and the plain language of the Release. A&A's request that a court rewrite key
documents and facts should be disregarded.
II.

Using Plain and Intentionally Broad Terms, the Release Discharged All

Counterclaims under the Consulting Agreement. At least four categories of released claims
are readily discernible from the "four corners of the agreement". A&A aka Viron "forever
discharged and released" the "Released Parties" from:
a) any and all claims for services performed "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant
(the "Project")",
b) any and all claims which in any way "relate to" or "arise out of" such services,
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c) any and all claims "asserted"' in the Civil Action (including a specific dispute under
the Consulting Agreement directly referenced in the 5/8/98 LOU, as described in and
attached to the verified Complaint filed therein), and
d) any and all claims that "could have been asserted" in the Civil Action.
Involving multiple "claims, counterclaims and disputes" that had arisen between the parties,
"including, without limitation, [the Civil Action]", the Civil Action describes and attaches
the 5/8/98 LOU, which plainly identifies a dispute with CoBon regarding A&A aka Viron's
obtaining of "suitable raw materials" and CoBon's "reservation" respecting all payment
obligations under the Consulting Agreement. The Release was "in consideration of the
settlement of all such "contemplated" claims. Vaughan v Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa.
Sup. 1994).
III.

A&A's Admissions Confirm the Released Claims Includes All Counterclaims.

A&A's testimony confirms the scope of released claims "relating to or arising out of' (1)
consulting services performed regarding the Robena Project, or (2) other consulting services
"relating" thereto, including the Consulting Agreement. (Facts pp. 16-17). The admissions
support the ruling that "[t]he scope and performance of the Consulting Agreement were
squarely implicated in the Civil Action" and the Release "operates to release . . . every
counterclaim". (3/1/10 Order, Fdg f 7. Cnclfflf4-6).
ARGUMENT
A.

A&A CANNOT CREATE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT BASED ON
CONCLUSORY ARGUMENTS OR STATEMENTS CONTRARY TO
SWORN TESTIMONY AND IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE
COURT TO REWRITE THE TERMS OF THE RELEASE.
-19-

L

Assertions Inconsistent With Sworn Testimony. Based on Argument or
Conclusorv in Nature Do Not Create Issues of Fact.

A&A cannot create a genuine issue of fact by simply contradicting their prior
admissions. To side step the legal effect of record admissions (under oath) regarding the
scope of the Release, A&A reference Messrs. Rodak and Visovsky's affidavits (prepared
post depositions), which improperly attempt to create the "appearance" of a dispute and to
divert the Court's attention from their prior sworn admissions. Settled law precludes the
contradiction of deposition testimony in this manner.16 A&A also attempt to introduce
immaterial, irrelevant and/or fabricated facts (i.e., an 8 year after-the-fact manufactured
theory of "mistake") relating to subjects of lengthy deposition testimony.
A&A's arguments directly contradict the testimony of Rodak and Visovsky. Glaring
examples are the arguments that Viron was "separate" and independent from A&A for
purposes of the Release and that A&A did not release claims under the Consulting
Agreement. (Aplt. Brief, 34-5). A&A admitted they were "interchangeably" known as
"Viron Energy" or "Viron" at all times and that "anytime there's a reference to Viron . . . it
would be to A&A" and "there is [no] other purpose than to substitute the name Viron" for
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Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983) ("when a party takes a
clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition" and
stating to do otherwise "undermine[s] the utility of summary judgment as a means for
screening out sham issues of fact"); Brinton v. IHCHosp., Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998)
(rejected affidavit contradicting prior sworn statements without adequate explanation).
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A&A because the names are simply "interchangeable". (Facts pp. 7-9) (emphasis added)).
Thus, A&A aka Viron entered into the Consulting Agreement, the 5/8/98 LOU, the 5/19/98
Letter of Understanding, the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, and the Release (based on their filing
of the Civil Action).
Conclusory argument17 and parol evidence are also inadmissible and do not create
issues of fact. For example, A&A's conclusory argument that A&A aka Viron's provision
of "services regarding the operation" of the Robena plant (i.e., "obtaining raw material
resources") after 7/1/98 was "entirely separate" from the Consulting Agreement is contrary
to the record. (Aplt. Brief, 10). The Consulting Agreement expressly required A&A to assist
with "obtaining suitable fines" and "operations" for an eleven year term. (Factsp. 7). A&A's
repeated use of the term "separate" (i.e., used 49 times), without evidence, is insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact, or to change the fact that a "dispute" had arisen under
the Consulting Agreement which was settled. (Facts pp. 9-11) and n.9, supra).
2.

A&A's Request That The Court Rewrite the Release and the Documentary
and Testimonial Record Should be Rejected.

17

Argument of counsel does not create an issue of fact; rather, "specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial" are required. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Attempts to defeat
summary judgment through conclusory and unsupported statements are improper.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) ("allegations . .
. or factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact");
Kelly v. U.S., 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991) (must produce specific admissible
evidence showing genuine material issues of fact; "[p]roof based on errant speculation,
optimistic surmise or farfetched inference will not suffice").
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Based largely on an appeal to equity,18 and on after-the-fact parol assertions of their
"actual" intent in drafting the verified Complaint and the Release (and contrary to their plain
language), A&A ask the Court to relieve them from their acts and contracts by having the
District Court overturned for refusing to:
a) rewrite the "verified" Complaint in the Civil Action filed by A&A to eliminate the
allegations and/or direct references to: I) the 5/8/98 LOU, ii) the LOU in monthly
invoices, iii) the underlying Consulting Agreement dispute, and iv) CoBon and
Counterdefendants; and to disavow CoBon's direct involvement in the breach of the
Consulting Agreement dispute as stated in the 5/8/98 LOU;
b) rewrite and disavow the 5/8/98 LOU and 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding, which
were described in, attached to and/or referenced in the verified Complaint, to
eliminate reference to: i) the Consulting Agreement and related services regarding

18

A&A refer to a preliminary 7/02 accounting (i.e., discussion draft) and
payments processed by CoBon after the Release was signed to contradict the plain terms
of the Release and in the hope of garnering sympathy. (Aplt. Brief, 38). While such is
parol evidence, as argued below (Tscpt. 73-75, 86-88, R. 6468-66, 6455-53), all payments
subsequent to the Release were 1) disputed advances/loans CoBon was arguably obligated
to make under the Consulting Agreement fl[ 4.0), subject to repayment and/or a final
accounting (which never occurred, and CoBon has sued for repayment), 2) subject to
CoBon's general reservations of all rights under the Consulting Agreement in the 5/8/98
LOU, and the specific reservation "to treat any fees paid . . . as additional advancement or
as CoBon may otherwise deem appropriate", or 3) advanced to "mollify and resolve a
continuing difficult relationship, trying to avoid this very lawsuit,55 which were
discontinued when the parties could no longer work together. (Tcrpt. 86-8, R. 6455-3).
See also discussion of A&A's unclean hands, n.l, supra.
Moreover, when the Release was executed, no one knew whether profit would even be
generated, much less the amount thereof CoBon had realized no profit at this point and
its millions in development costs were completely at risk. By grabbing the negotiated
$240,000 "bird-in-the-hand" settlement under the Release, A&A eliminated all risk that
they might receive nothing for its efforts under the Consulting Agreement. (Tscpt. 41-2
("[in] June of 2000, the success of these projects was very much up in the air. [The]
potential failure of the projects was very much up in the air"), R. 6500-499).
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the Robena project, ii) A&A's breach of the Consulting Agreement, iii) CoBon's
reservations of all rights under the Consulting Agreement, and iv) CoBon's
contractual obligation to cause Robena to a) execute the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement and
b) pay $15,000 per month to Viron, under protest;
c) rewrite the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement as an "integrated" contract eliminating any
continuing effect of: i) the predicate 5/8/98 LOU and ii) the Consulting Agreement;
and most importantly,
d) rewrite the basic terms and redefine the parties to the Release to: i) release only a
single, independent $60,000 fee dispute based exclusively on the foregoing
"rewritten" 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, ii) release only Robena from or relating to such
singular claim/dispute, and iii) expressly disclaim any relationship with and eliminate
reference to a) multiple "disputes", b) the "Released Parties", c) the 5/8/98 LOU, and
d) the Consulting Agreement.
As it is not the province of a court to either revise historic facts, or rewrite agreements, this
Court should affirm the District Court and reject A&A's request.19
While it impermissible for a court to rewrite the parties' contract, in this case, such
would change the entire history of their dealings. For example, in agreeing to proceed (under
protest) in the 5/8/98 LOU, CoBon expressly reserved "all" rights relating to the Consulting
Agreement (emphasis added):
As a result of this economic hardship, and without waiving any of its rights under
CoBon's November 1.1996 Consulting Agreement with [A&A], CoBon has decided to
move forward in working with you to solve this urgent problem. Inasmuch as CoBon has
previously made advanced distributions to [A&A] incident to this Project, and while

19

Courts should not rewrite contracts to relieve a party from a bargain later
regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica,
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd, 618 P.2d 497, 505
(Utah 1980) (court will not "make a better contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves" and,"[a]n express agreement... relating to a specific contract right excludes
the possibility of an implied covenant of a different.. . nature").
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reserving the right to treat any fees paid by the Project to Viron hereafter relating to
obtaining suitable raw materials as advancements or as CoBon may otherwise deem
appropriate, CoBon agrees to work with Viron . . . .
(5/8/98 LOU, Exh. E). Without retracting the foregoing, CoBon reiterated aspects of its
foregoing reservation in the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding (i.e., "regarding the scope of
consulting services" and implicitly all rights relating to liability, if any, to pay for such
services). (Exh. K, R. 2150-49). In proceeding, "without waiving any of its rights"
(including the right to treat payments as "deemed appropriate" by CoBon), CoBon clearly
reserved all rights under the Consulting Agreement, including for any of A&A's breaches
thereof (i.e., known or unknown). A&A's argument that CoBon "did not reserve any rights
regarding its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement" (Aplt. Brief, 23, 44-5)
contradicts the plain language in the Release and these incorporated documents.
Likewise, A&A aka Viron's narrow characterization of the subject of the Civil Action
as being "limited" to "only [a single $60,000 fee dispute" under the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement
(Aplt. Brief, 28, 36), contradicts their agreement that multiple "claims, counterclaims and
disputes" had arisen between them, "including, without limitation, [the Civil Action]". {Id.,
27; Exh. D). When A&A made that argument below, urging an interpretation of the dispute
as arising under only the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, the District Court insightfully asked:
"Well, why wasn't it written that way, then?" (Tscpt. 58-59; R. 6483-2) (bold added).20

20

A&A's conclusory assertion that the District Court "did not analyze" the
Release ignores the record. (Aplt. Brief, 18-9, 39). Based on a detailed analysis and
understanding of the issues, the District Court observed "one problem" with A&A's
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The District Court properly concluded that "[i]n the 5/8/98 LOU, CoBon expressly
reserved its rights regarding [A&A's] alleged breaches of the Consulting Agreement and
performance requirements thereof (3/1/10 Order, Fdg f 4, Cncl ^ 3) and ruled:
[The] interpretation of the terms of the Release or readings suggested by Defendants are
[sic] strained and would require the Court to ignore the plain meaning of the contract.
Such are unsupported and contrary to and ignore the plain meaning of the Release.
(M,Cncl^3,Fdg1J9,Exh.A).
Finally, as CoBon argued to the District Court, if a court were to accept A&A's parol

argument that the Release "was specific to the [7/1/98 Letter Agreement]". The
problem, of course, was "the language of the [Release] itself:
Court: [It] doesn't say all claims under a specific agreement It says all claims.
Savage: That would Court: And it specifically identifies the parties to this lawsuit. I mean, if- if, in
fact, by Robena they didn't include Nash, CoBon and all of those other
parties, why were they included and named as released parties in the
[Release]?
Court:

[Y]ou want me to add the phrase - where it says the Robena plant, you
want me to add the phrase - you want me to distinguish between the
development phase of the plant and the operations phase of the plant
Savage: No. Not really. That's background.

(Id., 69-71, R. 6472-0) (bold added). As to A&A's request that the Release not be read to
include a payment dispute under the Consulting Agreement, the District Court said:
Court:

I guess the trouble with that argument - and I understand what you're
saying. The trouble is if [A&A] say, You owe me $60,000 for this work
and [CoBon/Robena's] response is, No, we don't, we owe you your
consulting fee, and if that's the dispute and then they settle that
dispute, how does that not involve the scope of the consulting fee?

(Id., 11, R. 6464) (bold added).
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assertions that the "intended scope of release" was limited to the release of a single $60,000
payment claim between only two parties to a 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, there would be no
purpose whatsoever for the parties5 plain and broad:
1) use of the plural form of alleged "claims, counterclaims and disputes" and released
"claims, counterclaims,... actions . . . and causes of action";
2) use of the phrases "which relate to" or "arise out of5 and "any consulting services";
3) use of the phrase "including, without limitation, claims [i.e., plural] asserted i n . . . the
Civil Action" (the "verified" Complaint of which describes, attaches and incorporates
the 5/8/98 LOU, which specifically references a dispute "under the Consulting
Agreement", and attaches invoices referencing the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding);
4) use of the phrase "including, without limitation, claims [i.e., plural] . . . that could
have been asserted in, the Civil Action";
5) reference to numerous individual and entities (i.e., "Released Parties") other than the
two principal parties; and
6) omission of any reference to or attachment of the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement to or in the
Release.
(Release, Exh. B (emphasis added)).21 Had A&A aka Viron genuinely "intended" to limit
the scope of the Release, they could have easily done so.
B.

PAROL EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO VARY OR CONTRADICT
THE PLAIN TERMS OF THE " I N T E G R A T E D " AND

21

While Utah law is in accord and governs the Consulting Agreement,
Pennsylvania law governs the Release. See Exhs. B and C. See Davis v. Gov't
Employees Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2001) (releases interpreted under
rules of construction); Harrity v. Med. Coll of Pa. Hosp., 653 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1994) (language is viewed in context of entire document to give effect to each part);
Flatley v. Penman, 632 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1993) (terms not to be interpreted to
nullify or conflict with other terms) and record authorities. R. 2216).
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"ENFORCEABLE" RELEASE, INCLUDING THE RELEASED
PARTIES AND SCOPE OF RELEASED CLAIMS.
1.

The Release is a Fully "Integrated" Agreement.

A written contract is "integrated" if it represents a final and complete expression of
the parties' agreement. Lenziv. Hahnemann Univ., 664 A.2d 1375,1379 (Pa. Sup. 1995).22
The Release is clearly "integrated", as it also contains an "integration" clause, stating that it
"represents the entire understanding of the Parties and supersedes all prior written or oral
agreements, representations or understandings" relating thereto (Release, \ 7) and given
A&A's admitted intentions with respect thereto. (Facts pp. 16-17, n.14-15).
The "integrated" nature of the Release is also evidenced by the plain and complete
language of A&A's intent to release specifically defined "Released Parties" from
a) any and all claims for "consulting services which have been performed by [A&A
aka Viron] regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant";
b) any and all claims which in any way "relate" thereto or "arise" therefrom (i.e., claims
for services in addition to the services performed regarding the Robena plant);
c) any and all "claims asserted in . . . the Civil Action" (i.e., any and all matters
referenced in the verified Complaint or pleadings); and

22

See Roman Mosaic and Tile Co. v. Thomas P. Carney, Inc., 729 A.2d 73, 77
(Pa. Sup. 1999) (when terms "are clear and unequivocal, meaning must be determined
from the language itself and only "where the terms are ambiguous or the complete
agreement is not recorded", will court examine "surrounding circumstances to determine .
. . intent"); Bickings v. Bethlehem Lukens Plate, 82 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405-6 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (intent gathered from the language of the release); Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hosp.,
561 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa. 1989) (cannot evade clear language by asserting he did not
subjectively intend to release claim; a release that bars unknown claims will be enforced,
even if a party claims it was unaware of the matter) and record authorities. R. 2216).
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d) any and all "claims . .. that could have been asserted in, the Civil Action" (i.e., any
claims that existed or could have existed between the parties regardless of the context
of the Robena plant).
(Release, TJ1).23
2.

Parol Evidence Is Inadmissible to Alter or Contradict Release Terms.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, contradict, add to, or explain the terms of an
integrated and unambiguous contract.24 As each category of claims described in the Release
is plainly discharged, parol evidence to vary or contradict the existence or scope of such must
be disregarded. For example, A&A's request that the Court exclude from the Release claims
relating to the 5/8/98 LOU identified in the Civil Action clearly "varies'5 and "contradicts"
the plain language discharging all claims "including, without limitation, claims asserted in,
or that could have been asserted in, the Civil Action". (Id.).
In the Civil Action, A&A aka Viron "asserted" claims "relating to" the 5/8/98 LOU
(and invoices referencing the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding or "LOU"). (Exh. D (Exh.
23

See n.22, supra; Gemini Equip. Co. v. Pennsl Supply, Inc., 595 A.2d 1211, 1216
(Pa. Sup. 1991) (barring evidence of oral agreement to vary integrated written agreement;
despite absence of integration clause, the writing unambiguously detailed the obligations)
md Henry v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 459 A.2d 772, 776 (Pa. Sup. 1983)
(affirming summary judgment and finding evidence of alleged prior oral representations
barred by parol evidence rule upon finding loan agreement was complete).
24

See n.21-23, supra; Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const, 731 P.2d 483,
486 (Utah 1986) (excluding evidence not within the four corners of the document,
including "contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations offered for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract"; Lenzi, 664 A.2d at
1379 ("rule is to preserve the integrity of written agreements by refusing to permit the
contracting parties to attempt to alter the import of their contract through the use of
contemporaneous oral declarations") and record authorities. R. 1212-1064, 2214).
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A and D). The 5/8/98 LOU was specifically described in, and "attached" to, the verified
Complaint. A&A were the masters of their pleadings.25 Despite ample opportunity to do so,
A&A sought neither to amend their verified Complaint (to correct any mistakes or to
reference the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement), nor to exclude the 5/8/98 LOU in settling the Civil
Action. A&A aka Viron cannot now be heard to contradict or explain away their "assertion"
of the 5/8/98 LOU (i.e., that such was mistakenly asserted or should be excluded from the
scope of discharged claims). The parol evidence rule bars A&A aka Viron5 s 8 year after-thefact recharacterization of their "intent" in filing the Civil Action, and in signing the Release.
A&A aka Viron claimed that they were unilaterally mistaken in basing the Civil
Action on the 5/8/98 LOU for the first time in response to CoBon's Motion Re: Release.
However, as shown herein, no "mistake" occurred whatsoever, and A&A's argument
contradicts their contemporaneous actions.26 A&A aka Viron drafted their Complaint, chose
their theory, selected the facts and unilaterally decided to attach the 5/8/98 LOU and
associated invoices as grounds for their claims. The verified Complaint was not a negotiated
contract; rather, it unilaterally initiated a lawsuit, which was exclusively under A&A's

25

While A&A clearly chose not to identify, reference, or assert a claim for breach
of the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement (electing to sue under the 5/8/98 LOU instead (as well as
invoices submitted with direct reference to the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding)), their
choice, mistaken or not, to base their claim on the 5/8/98 LOU directly implicates the
dispute under the Consulting Agreement, given CoBon's reservation of all rights relating
thereto in the 5/8/98 LOU, as "asserted" in the Civil Action.
26

Even if a Court were to allow parol evidence, a unilateral mistake is not grounds
to avoid the legal effect of the Release. See discussion in Section H, infra.
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control, and which A&A settled without disclaiming their now allegedly "mistaken"
reference to the 5/8/98 LOU. A&A's parol argument that the basis of the Civil Action did
not relate to the 5/8/98 LOU fails. The parol evidence rule likewise cannot be used to
challenge the existence of the dispute under the Consulting Agreement or the terms of the
Release, including the scope of discharged claims.27
3.

The District Court Carefully Reviewed, But Rejected, Parol Evidence.

Given the lengthy oral argument (3-4 hours) and its "review[of] the briefs [and] the
exhibits that were submitted [which were] indeed voluminous'5 (4,020 pages) (Tscpt 124;
R. 6417), the District Court clearly considered all of A&A's parol arguments, before
rejecting such. Despite an inclination to simply ignore all parol evidence, the District Court
considered A&A's various, albeit strained, interpretations of the Release. (See Reply Sec.
C 6., pp. 44-7, R. 3613-3405). Judge Taylor advised that he had reviewed "the various letters
of understanding and the settlement agreement [and all] other documents". A&A conceded
that the motions should not be decided on the basis of "a question of fact", but "[because

27

While the Civil Action was contested, A&A aka Viron wrongly suggest that
CoBon's stated desire to settle such (i.e., "By 2000 CoBon was telling Palmer and
Providian that they should be paid [sic] this contract"; Tscpt. 124; R. 6464; Aplt. Brief,
14, 24) somehow renders the terms of the "unambiguous" and "integrated" Release
meaningless. CoBon, Synfoel #2 and Robena only agreed to settle the Civil Action,
subject to the terms their counsel negotiated in the Release, which discharged all of A&A
aka Viron's claims under the Consulting Agreement. Ironically, A&A's argument that
CoBon was involved in facilitating the settlement (id.) contradicts their incorrect position
elsewhere that CoBon had nothing to do with the settlement. See n.30, infra.
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Appellees are simply] wrong on the law." (Tscpt. 59-61, R. 6482-80).
The District Court also specifically discussed the absence of any potential ambiguity
in the Release (bold added):
Court: Well, what is there in that contract [Release] that is ambiguous?
Savage: Oh, I don't think there's any (Id, 70, R. 6471). While the District Court gave them ample opportunity to show a genuine
dispute of fact or an ambiguity in the Release, A&A aka Viron could not do so.
C

UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW A&A WERE ALTERNATIVELY
KNOWN AS VIRON ENERGY AT ALL MATERIAL TIMES.

At all material times, Rodak, Visovsky, Alpine and/or AGTC used and/or were known
by the names of "Viron Energy55 and/or "Viron". Despite their contradictory and illogical
assertions (Aplt. Brief 11, 45-7) (i.e., that their admittedly "interchangeable" names under
the Consulting Agreement were not really such, because CoBon did not commonly use Viron
to refer to them), the evidence remains undisputed that "Viron Energy was the 'A&A5
referred to in the Consulting Agreement" and was "a name for the joint venture/ partnership
between [A&A] that entered into and performed the Consulting Agreement.55 (Facts pp. 7-9,
n.8). Based on A&A5s extensive sworn admissions, the District Court properly found that,
"[a]t all material times55, A&A "did business55 and were known as Viron Energy or Viron, and

28

During oral argument, Judge Taylor affirmatively acknowledged Appellees5
summary: "Your Honor . .. what I heard was no attempt to refute the facts that are
operative in this case, those facts that I laid out with respect to the dispute ending in the
settlement agreement, in fact, an admission that the Court can make a determination
. . as a matter of law, based upon those facts.55 (Id., 6456-5) (bold added).
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that each was "a dba of A&A" and "synonymous" with A&A "for all purposes in the action".
(3/1/10 Order, Fdg ^ 2; Facts pp. 7-9).
D.

UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATE THE RELEASE IS LEGALLY
ENFORCEABLE AND BINDING UPON A&A.

The Release was fairly negotiated and voluntarily and knowingly executed by A&A
aka Viron. As an agent and partner, and with the consent of Visovsky (i.e., AGTC), Rodak
(i.e., Alpine) signed the Release "intending to be bound" and A&A received the stated new
consideration of $60,000 (and retained the $ 180,000 previously paid under protest). (Facts
pp. 15-16). Having expressly acknowledged that the Release "may be enforced", that they
were "fully educated" and competent, and that they had read, understood and entered the
"integrated" Release with the "advice of counsel" and without compulsion or duress, A&A
have no basis to now avoid its binding and enforceable effect. (Id.; Release,fflf4, 7,11,12,
Exh. B; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg 1j 9, Cnclffif6,10).29

29

Though not argued before the District Court, A&A raise a "consideration" issue
in suggesting for the first time (without legal support) the Release as enforced was not
"equal" in scope. (Aplt. Brief, 34). On its face, the Release refers to both the settlement
of claims and the payment (i.e., and retention) of money as part of its stated consideration.
While A&A's argument is procedurally improper, cases cited by A&A support
enforcement of the Release. See Fedun v. Mike's Case, Inc., 204 A.2d 776 (PA. 1964)
(release "consideration" can be monetary or giving up legal rights); Estate Landscape and
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Teleg. Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah
1992) (though not factually analogous, surrender of rights is adequate consideration for
release); Facts pp. 15-16) c, e and f); 3/1/10 Order, ^ 9 ("settlement [was] supported by
consideration"); n.19, supra; and 5/8/98 LOU, Exh. E (under economic duress "in the
twelfth hour and [with] literally millions... invested" and fearing "the Project will be in
jeopardy and may fail altogether", CoBon agreed to pay A&A $15,000/mo fee and later
agreed to the Release not knowing if projects would succeed).
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E.

THE RELEASE BARS THE COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST THE
"RELEASED PARTIES", AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Release plainly shows that A&A aka Viron released each Appellee, as a named
or defined entity or individual, from "any and all" specified claims. A&A released as
"Released Parties'5, the "Parties" (i.e., "Robena"), and each of their
past, present or future parent or affiliated companies, and/or entities, and each of their
respective past, present or future predecessors, successors, . . shareholders, partners,
directors, attorneys, officers,. . . servants, employees, agents, managers, members and
assigns, including, without limitation, . . . Robena LP, . . . CoBon Synfuel #2, LLC,
Cobon Energy, LLC, Steven R. Nash, Robert Nash . . . .
(Release, ^ 1). The Release identifies, inter alia, CoBon, CoBon Synfuel #2, LLC ("Synfuel
#2"), Steven R. Nash, Robert Nash, Kelly Nash and Anton Tone, and their respective agents
and assigns, as "Released Parties". Both Kelly Nash (CoBon, Synfuel #2 and/or Robena's
prior and then acting attorney, officer, servant, employee, agent and/or member) and Anton
Tone (CoBon and Robena's officer, servant, employee, agent and/or member) are plainly
identified, directly or indirectly, as Released Parties. (Facts pp. 15-16; 3/1/10 Order, Fdg ^f 8,
Cncip).
Notably, while a "Released Party55, CoBon functioned on behalf of Robena in
negotiating, approving and executing the Release.30 Just as CoBon was a party to the 5/8/98

30

A&A's suggestion that CoBon was not involved in the negotiation, drafting or
execution of the Release is contrary to the record. (Aplt. Brief, 14-5, 25-7). As
evidenced by Steve Nash's signature on the Release, in his capacity as the Manager of
CoBon, which served as the Manager of Synfuel #2, which served as the General Partner
of Robena, LP, the owner of Robena, Steve Nash was the only person authorized to
negotiate and execute the Release. Despite A&A's inconsistent arguments, CoBon
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LOU, which was the basis for the Civil Action (i.e., and obligated for Robena's payments
to A&A aka Viron), so Steve Nash, CoBon's Manager, also 1) drafted, approved and signed
the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement in furtherance of and to complete CoBon's contractual duty
under the 5/8/98 LOU, 2) approved and effectuated all payments by Robena, 3) signed all
checks, and 4) approved and executed the Release.
F.

USING BROAD LANGUAGE, THE RELEASE DISCHARGED ALL
COUNTERCLAIMS UNDER THE CONSULTING AGREEMENT.

"[I]n consideration o f a $60,000 payment and the settlement of the multiple disputed
"claims, counterclaims and disputes" that had arisen between the parties, "including, without
limitation, [the Civil Action]", A&A aka Viron "forever discharged and released" the
Released Parties:
from any and all claims, counterclaims, debts, actions, judgments, and causes of action
which relate to or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by
Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the "Project") including, without
limitation, claims asserted in, or that could have been asserted in, the Civil Action.
(Release, f 1; Facts pp. 15-17 (emphasis added)). This language plainly includes:
a) any and all claims for services performed "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant
(the "Project")";
b) any and all claims which in any way "relate to" or "arise out of such services (i.e.,
in addition but related to or arising from services performed regarding the Robena
plant);

remained affiliated with Robena at all times. Steve and Kelly Nash (counsel for CoBon
and its affiliates) negotiated, directly and indirectly, with A&A's counsel, to jointly draft,
edit and finalize the Release. (Second K. Nash Affid., R. 2339-10; see also Aplt. Brief,
24) (Steve Nash was involved in virtually all dialogue, see id at Exhs. R, T, U and V).
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c) any and all claims "asserted" in the Civil Action; and
d) any and all claims that "could have been asserted5' in the Civil Action (i.e., in addition
to the claims asserted).
Governing law holds that all matters fairly said to have been "within the contemplation of
the parties" according to the plain language of a release are released.31 As discussed infra,
these categories of discharged claims contradict A&A's assertion that the "intended scope
of release" was limited "to the release of "only their [single $60,000] fee dispute with
Robena" under the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement. (Aplt. Brief, 36). As the District Court
recognized, A&A's interpretation renders meaningless and there would be no purpose
whatsoever for the parties' plain and broad:
1) use of the plural form of alleged "claims, counterclaims and disputes . . . including,
without limitation, [the Civil Action]" and released "claims, counterclaims, . . .
actions .. . and causes of action";
2) use of the phrases "which relate to" or "arise out o f and "any consulting services";
3) use of the phrase and plural form of "including, without limitation, claims asserted in
. . . the Civil Action" (the "verified" Complaint of which describes, attaches and

31

See Vaughan v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa. Sup. 1994); Three Rivers Motors
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 897 (3 rd Cir. 1975) (enforced "general settlement of
all claims" to bar "unknown" claims "even though the release did not expressly include
the terms 'known and unknown' claims"); Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1967);
Bickings, 82 F. Supp. 402 and n.21-3, supra.
A&A's position that the Release cannot bar claims under the Consulting Agreement
"because they did not state [they] were . . . releasing any claims [thereunder]" is
untenable. The use of "any and all" to comprehensively describe the scope of claims to
be discharged eliminates the need to identify each claim.
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incorporates the 5/8/98 LOU, which specifically references a dispute "under the
Consulting Agreement", and attaches invoices referencing the 5/19/98 Letter of
Understanding);
4) use of the phrase "including, without limitation, claims [i.e., plural] . . . that could
have been asserted in, the Civil Action";
5) reference to numerous individual and entities (i.e., "Released Parties") other than the
two principal parties; and
6) omission of any reference to or attachment of the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, in the
Release.
(Release, Exh. B (emphasis added)).32 Accordingly, the nature and categories of released
claims are clear from the "four corners of the agreement" and may be so interpreted without
resort to parol evidence.
1.

The Release Plainly Discharged All Claims For Services Performed
"Regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the 'Project')".

In construing the scope of this clause in the Release, it is helpful to understand that
the Robena Project was a synfuel development project a) undertaken under the Consulting
Agreement long before the Release, and b) A&A aka Viron's duties thereunder included
development and operation related services. First, The Robena Project was not a new project
which arose after the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, but was an ongoing project under the
Consulting Agreement.

Undisputedly, A&A aka Viron had periodically performed

32

See 3/1/10 Order, Fdg 9 ("Release is both integrated and unambiguous") and
Cncl 3 ("no basis to limit the plain scope of the Release. The interpretation of the terms.
.. or readings suggested by [A&A] are strained
Such are unsupported and contrary
to and ignore the plain meaning of the contract.").
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consulting services on the "Robena Project" for nearly 2 years prior to the 5/8/98 LOU. In
A&A's 3/27/98 letter, which introduces the "Viron Proposal", A&A identify the "Robena
Project" in the letter and state:
As you are aware [A&A] herein after (sic) referred to as Viron Energy, are party to a
December 5,1996 Consulting Agreement with Robena proj ect developer CoB on Energy,
LLC. As per the agreement, Viron Energy shall devote such consulting time and
resources as are reasonably required to assist and support CoB on in connection with the
identification, evaluation and obtaining suitable raw material resources
With regard
to the Robena project, Viron has successfully performed the aforementioned duties to
secure financing and construction commencement.
(3/27/98 Letter, Exh. H) (emphasis added).33 A&A's letter not only evidences the prior
existence of the Robena project, but also the connection between the "Consulting
Agreement" (and their "duties" thereunder), and the "Robena project" in the Release. See
also 4/10/98 Letter to AGTC (references CoB on5 s work on the Robena project). Clearly,
pursuant to the Consulting Agreement, the Robena Project had been identified and worked
on by A&A prior to both the 5/8/98 LOU and the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement, and A&A
acknowledged their duty to obtain "suitable raw materials" thereunder.
Second, despite A&A's urged rewriting, the Release does not even mention, and

33

On April 3, 1998, CoBon sent a memo to A&A regarding the "Robena Project."
(4/3/98 Memo, R. 6548-Exh. 399). On April 7, 1998, prior to the 5/8/98 LOU, A&A
likewise wrote to Steve Nash regarding the Robena Project, "[t]his fax concerns the
engineering, design, and construction of the preparation plant by Robena Partners at
Consol5s Robena Plant." (4/7/98 Letter, R. 6548-Exh. 402). Clearly, prior to the 5/8/98
LOU, the "Robena Project" was in development, and A&A were performing services
"regarding the Robena Project", under the Consulting Agreement. See Exh. E.
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certainly makes no distinction between, "development" and "operation" related work at
Robena. Indeed, the Consulting Agreement refers to and obligates A&A to furnish both
development and operation related assistance for any facilities for an eleven year term,
regardless of a third party sale thereof (Facts p. 7). As a minority owner and general
partner, and/or as a plant manager, CoBon had an eleven year responsibility for the
successful "operation" of Robena, regarding which A&A were retained to assist by, inter
alia, providing "suitable raw materials" for plant operation. (Id and n.28, supra).
Thus, in broadly referring to the discharge of claims for services "regarding the
Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the "Project")", the Release bars A&A's counterclaims
concerning the Robena project under the Consulting Agreement and otherwise.34
2.

The Release Plainly Discharged All Claims That "Relate To" or "Arise" Out
Of Services Performed Regarding the Project.

Defining the discharged claims as also including all claims that "relate to or arise out
o f any consulting sendees which have been performed regarding the Robena Project, this
clause plainly expands the scope of the Release to encompass the broader relationship

34

Cases cited by A&A actually support the District Court's enforcement of the
Release. See Bickings, 82 F. Supp. 402 (enforced release to bar unknown claims even
though "party claims that it was unaware of the matter at the tune release was executed"),
citing Three Rivers, 522 F.2d at 897 (enforced "general settlement of all claims" to bar
"unknown" claims "even though the release did not expressly include the terms 'known
and unknown5 claims") and Restifo, supra (enforced limiting terms in release to claims
arising "prior to and including the date hereof5).
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between CoBon and A&A. To construe it otherwise renders the phrase meaningless.35 A&A
are releasing not only claims for services performed directly "regarding the Robena project",
but also claims in any way "relating" thereto or "arising" therefrom. As A&A were to assist
with the Robena Project development and operation under the Consulting Agreement,
A&A's release of all claims "which relate to or arise out of any consulting services which
have been performed by Viron regarding the [Robena Project]" includes any other projects
thereunder, including the Pace and PBS projects.
The rational phrase "relating to" is as broad as permitted in the English language.
It is well understood that "[t]he ordinary meaning of [the phrase 'relating to5] is a broad
one - 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with."
Central States Found, v. Balka, 590N.W.2d832,837 (Neb. 1999) (quoting Morales v. TWA,
504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). Other courts have similarly broadly defined the term.36
The phrase "arising out o f is similarly broad. Courts have "concluded that [the

35

A&A's argument that it "qualifies" but does not "expand" the scope of release is
strained and unsupported as there is no limiting language whatsoever in the Release.
(Aplt. Brief, 34). Rather, the intended scope is stated as being "without limitation".
36

See Snowden v. School Distr. No. 401, 231 P.2d 621, 625 (Wash. 1951)
("relating to" means "in respect to; in reference to; in regard to"); Contractors Ass }n v.
West Virginia DP A, 434 S.E.2d 357, 369 (W. Va. 1993) ("[t]he ordinary meaning of
'relating to5 is that there is a connection between two subjects, not that the subjects have
to be the same."); Central States, at 837 ("phrase 'relating to5 is to be read broadly and
should be interpreted as being comprehensive of the subject indicated"); Dairies v.
Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008) (broad "in connection with" phrase was
"unambiguous" and absent facial ambiguity, the parties' intentions must be determined
solely from the language of the contract.") and record authorities. R. 2200).
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phrase] requires only 'some level of causation greater than coincidence."5 Martinez v.
Citizens Prop. Insur., 982 So.2d 57, 58-9 (Fla. App. 2008).
Accordingly, "[ajrising out of are words of much broader significance then [sic] 'caused
by.' They are ordinarily understood to mean 'originating from/ 'having its origin in/
growing out of or 'flowing from/ or in short, 'incident to or having connection with..

Id, 58-9; Miller v. Tobin, 542 N.E.2d 173, 174 (111. App. 1989) ("phrase 'arising out of is
broad and generally means 'originating from/ growing out of/ or flowing from"5).
Under these recognized definitions, the District Court concluded any claim arising
under the Consulting Agreement (including all counterclaims) "relates55 to A&A5 s consulting
services performed on the Robena Project, since the Robena project was a synfuel project
identified and developed by CoBon under such Consulting Agreement, and "arises out of5
the same consulting services. (3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 7, Cncl ^f 5). This conclusion is also
confirmed by A&A5s sworn admissions. (Facts pp. 16-17, and Sec. G, infra). Thus, when
construed in its entirety, the Release discharges the broader category of "claims"5, which in
any way "relate to55 or "arise out of5 the services performed regarding the Robena Project,
which includes all of A&A5 s counterclaims.
As the law strongly favors the enforcement of releases and broadly construes language
defining the scope of a release, this Court should enforce the language intentionally used in
the Release.37 While A&A suggest the use of the objective phrase "regarding the Robena

37

"Broad release provisions extend to all claims between the parties except for
those which are expressly reserved.55 Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v Labrum, 2008 UT App.
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Synthetic Fuel Plant" constitutes a reservation, such is clearly not the case. This phrase, at
most, provides an example of one synfuel project, among several, that "relate to" or "arise
out o f the Consulting Agreement. Clearly, any claim "regarding the Robena Project" is
expressly released. In addition, however, the Release also expressly releases CoBon from
any claims, which "relate to" consulting services regarding the Robena Project. Reference
to services which have been performed regarding the Robena Project thus simply creates an
objective criteria for determining the broader intended scope of released claims (i.e., which
must merely be "related to" the consulting services performed regarding the Robena proj ect).
3.

The Release Plainly Discharged All Claims "Asserted or That Could Have
Been Asserted" in the Civil Action. Including Those Relating to or Based
Upon the 5/8/98 LOU and Any Rights Reserved By CoBon Therein.

The parties' use of the "catchall" phrase, "including, without limitation, claims
asserted in, or that could have been asserted in, the Civil Action" (Release, *f 1) is also fatal
to A&A aka Viron's argument that counterclaims under the Consulting Agreement have not
been released. Having expressly referenced the "Civil Action" as within the scope of
released claims, the parties' plainly stated intent cannot be "contradicted" by A&A aka
Viron's parol arguments. By referencing the "Civil Action", A&A incorporated the

69, ^| 20. Though they could have done so, A&A aka Viron did not "reserve" any claims
against Appellees; rather, they discharge many Released Parties, unnamed in the Civil
Action, and broadly state that, though "disputes" had arisen, they desired to forever
discharge such from "any and all claims, counterclaims,. . . which relate to or arise out of
the consulting services which have been performed". (Release, f 1; Facts pp. 15-16. and
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allegations thereof, exhibits thereto and claims referenced therein.
A&A's "verified" Complaint in the Civil Action specifically describes, alleges and
admits the 5/8/98 LOU as the basis for the Civil Action and even refers to CoBon, and its
obligations:
The Defendant entered into a Letter of Understanding ("LOU") with [A&A aka Viron]
on May 8, 1998 through its agent CoBon Energy, LLC .. . whereby Plaintiff would be
paid a consulting fee . . . for its assistance in identifying, evaluating and obtaining
suitable coal fines to be purchased by CoBon, or its assigns. A [copy is] attached hereto
and made part hereof by reference.
(Verified Complaint f 3, R. 1161-57; Exh. D). As shown above, the 5/8/98 LOU and A&A's
disputed nonperformance of the Consulting Agreement (memorialized therein) are central
to the Civil Action. The 5/8/98 LOU expressly identified and reserved all of CoBon's rights
against A&A aka Viron relating to the Consulting Agreement:
As you know, this Project is in the twelfth hour and literally millions have been invested
by CoBon and Providian. As previously indicated, CoBon is frustrated that identifying
and obtaining a suitable short term raw material supply has even become a problem.
Nevertheless, CoBon is understandably more concerned that if suitable coal fines are not
located immediately, the Project will be in jeopardy and may fail altogether. As a result
of this economic hardship, and without waiving any of its rights under CoBon's
November L 1996 Consulting Agreement with [A&A], CoBon has decided to move
forward in working with you to solve this urgent problem. Inasmuch as CoBon has
previously made advanced distributions to [A&A] incident to this Project, and while
reserving the right to treat any fees paid by the Project to Viron hereafter relating to
obtaining suitable raw materials as advancements or as CoBon may otherwise deem
appropriate, CoBon agrees to work with Viron . . . .
(5/8/98 LOU, Exh. E; see also 4/10/98 Letter (emphasis added).38 Such plainly and directly

38

Despite A&A's efforts to "separate55 the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement from the
operative 5/8/98 LOU (calling it a "separate" agreement at least 49 times in their Brief),
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included a payment dispute under the Consulting Agreement. See n.20, supra.
Clearly, the 5/8/98 LOU not only was a stated basis for the "claims asserted", but also
"could have been" a basis for such, along with other documents, including the referenced
5/19/98 Letter of Understanding and related Consulting Agreement. It was included in the
multiple "claims, counterclaims and disputes" of the parties, as referenced in the Release.
As the District Court observed, having generally "reserved" all rights under the Consulting
Agreement, including specifically to treat payments to Viron as "advances" or "as CoBon
may otherwise deem appropriate", CoBon (acting dually, or through Robena) had the right
to dispute A&A aka Viron's claims based on such in the Civil Action. See n.20, 27, supra.
When the 5/8/98 LOU, and its "reservation" of all rights under the Consulting Agreement,
are considered as the stated basis for the "verified" Complaint, the released claims include
any dispute under the Consulting Agreement.
When the verified Complaint, and attached 5/8/98 LOU, are viewed plainly, it is easy
to understand why the District Court found and concluded:
The scope and performance of the Consulting Agreement were squarely implicated in the
Civil Action and the contingency payments to be made in the future under the Consulting
Agreement were also in play in the Civil Action.

the 5/8/98 LOU, signed by CoBon, obligated CoBon, on its face, "to take steps . . . to
obtain Robena's consent to the proposed terms of the consulting agreement [i.e., the
7/1/98 Letter Agreement] and coordinate with Robena for . . . an advance consulting fee
payment in the initial amount of $15,000." (Exh. E). CoBon thereby assumed a
contractual duty regarding and guaranteed Robena's execution of the 7/1/98 Letter
Agreement and payments.
-43-

(3/1/10 Order, Fdg f 7, Cncl f 1; Fdgffif1, 3-5, 9, Cnclffif4-5).
4.

The Release Unequivocally Discharged A&A's Counterclaims Regardless of
When Such May Have Come Into Existence or Accrued.

A&A's argument that the release of any claim arising out of services "which have
been performed" does not include claims that may be asserted in the future is unavailing.
(Aplt. Brief, 39-40). In discharging all claims "relating to" or "arising" out of any consulting
services "which have been performed by [A&A aka Viron Energy]", the Release plainly bars
such claims regardless of when such claims have been or might be filed or might be said to
accrue. (Release, ^f 1 (emphasis added)). On its face, the Release anticipates that if any
claim (i.e., past, present or future) in any way "relates to" or "arises out o f any of the
services which have been performed, the same is discharged. In like manner, if a future
claim is based on a matter "asserted" or which "could have been asserted", the same is
released. Consistent with this "forward-looking" language, the Release is also enforceable
by the Released Parties and any of their "future" affiliates or their "future" agents. (Facts pp.
15-16).
Disregarding this logic and ignoring their contrary sworn statements and the plain
Release language showing the known existence of the "claims, counterclaims and disputes,"
A&A erroneously assert the counterclaims could not have been released as they did not exist
or had not accrued. A&A erroneously reason that CoB on had not yet received revenues from
which payments could be made, or the counterclaims were not known, or foreseeable, and
therefor, such "future" claims could not have accrued as of June 28, 2000. As determined
-44-

by the District Court, however, A&A's arguments fail for several reasons. First, the Release
is general and does not limit the time within which a claim must be filed. To the contrary,
as in virtually all releases, the language expressly and impliedly anticipates the discharge of
claims that might be asserted in the future. By inviting a judicial imposition of a time
limitation, in lieu of the anticipatory language used, A&A seek to alter the Release in
violation of the parol evidence rule.
Second, A&A testified that, as of June 30,1998, A&A had completely "performed"
their duties under the Consulting Agreement, and that no further services were required for
them to be entitled to compensation. Based upon such past performance, if a claim relating
thereto or arising therefrom is asserted, regardless of when it is asserted, the same was clearly
known or anticipated to exist and is barred.39
Third, it is fundamental that a cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained
thereon.40 Ironically, A&A aka Viron actually filed the Civil Action, directly or indirectly,
against, and released, CoBon from, inter alia, the claims "asserted" therein relating to the
5/8/98 LOU (including A&A's breach of the Consulting Agreement). Despite CoBon's
reservation in the 5/8/98 LOU, by the Civil Action, A&A actually forced CoBon/Robena to
39

See 3/1/10 Order, Fdg % 7; Rodak Depo. Vol. 2 at 274-275, Vol. 4 at 514-16,
Exh. F; Visovsky Depo. Vol. 2 at 340-3, 367-8, 378, Exh. G.
40

Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., v. Energypro Constr. Partners,
111 A.D.2d 233, 234 (N.Y. App. 2000) (claim accrues when designer "completes its
performance of significant (i.e., non-ministerial) duties under the parties' contract");
International Potato Corp. v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 602, 604 (1958) (claim accrues when
performance required of plaintiff has been fulfilled).
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pay fees to A&A for the very services required under the Consulting Agreement (the
payment of which was to be deferred). A&A's argument is disingenuous, as A&A "actually55
sued on their accrued payment claim, and CoBon, via the Release, paid a pricey ransom (i.e.,
$240,000) for such services. Moreover, while A&A only chose to assert limited claims in
the Civil Action, they may have maintained a myriad of additional claims such as anticipatory
or other breaches of the Consulting Agreement and/or declaratory or injunctive relief, all of
which are discharged.
Fourth, the so-called "accrual55 case of Vaughn v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38 (Pa. Sup.
1994) cited by A&A is distinguishable and/or actually supports enforcement of the Release,
as parties may contract to discharge future claims that are known, anticipated or foreseeable.
After Vaughan was injured by Wood in a car accident, he settled by broadly
discharging] Woods and all other persons, firms and corporations from all claims . . . of
any kind the undersigned now has or hereafter may have on account of, or in any way
growing out of personal injuries known or unknown to me/us at the present time . . .
resulting or to result from [accident] on 8/12/83.
(Id. at 39). Seven (7) months post accident, Vaughan independently contacted Dr. Didizian,
who, nine (9) months post accident, negligently performed surgery on Vaughan. When
Vaughan sued Dr. Didizian for malpractice, the court enforced the release against Vaughan.
The appellate court reversed, concluding the parties did not intend to bar a future malpractice
claim and refusing to interpret the release so broadly, as against public policy. Concluding
the parties did not intend to release a malpractice claim that accrued nine months after the
release was signed, the Vaughan court ruled an unrelated third party malpractice claim, for
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medical services that had not yet even been rendered, was "not [fairly] within the
contemplation55 of the parties to the release. (Id. at 41).
Unlike Vaughan, and based on A&A5s admissions, the District Court found that as
of June 30, 1998, "[A&A] had performed all requisite services under the Consulting
Agreement.5541

Moreover, A&A have admitted a "dispute55 existed with respect to such

services, as confirmed in the 5/8/98 LOU. Clearly, the counterclaims relating to the 5/8/98
LOU and to A&A5 s disputed nonperformance under the Consulting Agreement were not only
foreseen, but also actually known, as asserted in the Civil Action.42
Fifth, A&A5s arguments ignore CoBon5s a) assertion of economic duress, b)
reservations regarding A&A5s non performance, and c) claim that A&A were not entitled to
any compensation. A&A were well aware that a dispute existed regarding A&A5s breach of
the Consulting Agreement, having "acknowledged and consented55 thereto in the 5/8/98 LOU.
Undisputedly, such dispute was "within the contemplation of the parties when the release
41

(3/1/10 Order, Fdg ^ 7; see Tscpt 72 ("The performance by [A&A] was done5),
R. 6469; n.39; Exh. F - Rodak Depo. Vol. 4, 514-6 (as "[their] scope of work was over55,
they "didn't have any more work to do.55); Exh. G - Visovsky Depo. Vol. II, 378 ("Our
obligations were fulfilled55)).
42

A&A5s other citations offer no support. See record R. 2192) analysis of Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers' Ass 3n., 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), Nationwide Ins. Co. v.
Schneider, 906 A.2d 586 (Pa. Sup. 2006) and ContinentalBk & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306
P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1957). A&A5s argument (Aplt. Brief, 30) that the law "observes the
accrual of claim rule upon repudiation*5 is incomplete. See Total Control, Inc., v.
Danaher Corp., 359 F. Supp. 2d 387, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (case does not involve
interpretation of or analysis of claim accrual under a release, holding only that under
statute of limitations analysis for payments due under a commissions sales contract, that
"a separate and distinct cause of action accrue[s] as each payment [comes] due55).
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was given", as the 5/8/98 LOU was a stated basis for the Civil Action. Vaughan, at 40.
Moreover, A&A's argument that CoBon had communicated a "clear intention" of paying
consulting fees under the Consulting Agreement is contrary to CoBon5s reservation in the
5/8/98 LOU (as reiterated), is contrary to the nature of the funds subsequently paid, as loans
or advances (and subject to repayment for which CoBon has sued), and contrary to the
Release terms. See discussion n.18, supra.
Finally, but importantly, A&A aka Viron's position that the Release "resolve[d] only
[a single $60,000] fee dispute" between A&A aka Viron and Robena (under the 7/1/98 Letter
Agreement) contradicts and renders meaningless the expansively defined "Released Parties",
the references to multiple alleged and settled disputes, and the "relate to", "arise out o f and
"including, but not limited to" catchall language therein. Their position likewise ignores the
Release, which states that multiple "claims, counterclaims and disputes" had arisen between
the parties, which were settled. (Aplt. Brief 15, 27-8, 36; Exh. D; see also discussion Sec.
F. 2., supra).
The District Court considered, but rejected, A&A's so-called "non-accrual of future
claims" argument, and specifically concluded the Release discharged the disputed claims and
all claims relating to the Consulting Agreement. (3/1/10 Order, Cncl % 5). "Having reviewed
the pleadings and papers filed" and "[hjaving received,the extensive oral argument of
counsel", the District Court's ruling that "[t]he interpretation of the terms of the Release or
readings suggested by [A&A] are strained [and] are unsupported and contrary to and ignore
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the plain meaning of the Release" should be affirmed. (3/1/10 Order, Intro, ^ 2 and Cncl %
3).43
G.

UNDISPUTED ADMISSIONS OF A&A ESTABLISH THE
COUNTERCLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RELEASED
CLAIMS "RELATED TO55 A&A'S CONSULTING SERVICES.

While the plain language of the Release expressly includes the parties' dispute under
the Consulting Agreement, as argued, supra, A&A have also admitted, under oath, that the
scope of intended released claims includes those "relating to or arising out o f 1) consulting
sendees performed regarding the Robena Project, or 2) other consulting services "relating"
thereto, including the Consulting Agreement. A&A have admitted that "the claims that
[A&A are] asserting in this case against CoBon Energy relat[e] to or aris[e] out of . . .
consulting services that [A&A] performed regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" and
that "with respect to the position that [A&A] are asserting as a party in this case, all of
[A&A's] claims arise out of and will be defined by this consulting agreement". (Facts pp.
16-17).
Visovsky testified that "the three projects [concerning which A&A] have asserted
claims against [CoBon] are Pace, PBS and Robena", that "those are the three projects that
[A&A] believe CoBon has received money from", and that "each of these projects are related

43

A&A's assertions that the District Court "did not analyze the language of [the
Release] to determine [its] intended scope" and that the dispute "did not concern CoBon5s
duty to pay under the Consulting Agreement" (Aplt. Brief, 18-9) ignores its detailed
rulings, which show the depth of its review and soundness of its reasoning and judgment.
See also District Court dialogue excerpts, Sees. A.2., B.3. and n.20 and 28, supra.
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to the consulting services [A&A] agreed to provide under the consulting agreement". (Id).
Referring to A&A's claimed share of CoBon revenues for the Pace, PBS and Robena
projects, Visovsky admitted (emphasis added):
for purposes of [A&A's] analysis and claim of [A&A's] entitlements for compensation
under the consulting agreement, all of the projects worked on [or] developed by CoBon
. . . which produced any revenue are all related together under the consulting agreement

(Id.). Moreover, A&A aka Viron have admitted to having advanced herein a legal claim or
theory that "[A&A] have a right to a share" of "any compensation that CoBon received or
income that CoBon received from Pace [and the PBS or Robena projects]" because "[such
compensation is] related to the consulting agreement." (Id.). A&A also acknowledged that
"A&A's services in connection with the Pace [and the PBS and Robena] projects] arise out
of and relate to the CoBon consulting agreement." (Id.). As testified to by Visovsky
(AGTC), each of these projects directly "related to" the consulting services A&A agreed to
provide under the Consulting Agreement. (Id,).
As to the scope of the discharge given to CoBon, the sworn testimony of A&A, the
4/10/98 Letter (Exh. J), and the resulting 5/8/98 LOU (Exh. E), establish the requisite
"relatedness" of the counterclaims to the Robena Project.
H.

A&A CANNOT BE RELIEVED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RELEASE BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF MISTAKE.

Though without any legal authority and contrary to sworn facts, A&A unsuccessfully
sought relief from the Release based on a creative unilateral "mistake" theory in the District
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Court. On appeal, A&A have retooled their mistake theory, now disingenuously referring
to it as a mere "misidentification" of the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement or stating they "simply
identified the wrong document5'.44 (Aplt. Brief, 14). Based on this recharacterization, and
contrary to their description in and incorporated exhibits to the "verified" Complaint, Exh.
D, (including the 5/8/98 LOU and invoices referencing the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding,
and not the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement), A&A continue to incorrectly suggest that the Civil
Action really involved "only claims . . . under the [7/1/98 Letter Agreement]". (Aplt. Brief,
16, 45-6). As discussed, CoBon caused the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement to be executed in
performance of its express contractual duty under the 5/8/98 LOU.45 Based on A&A's
reconstructed history, A&A blindly persist in arguing the Civil Action did not "involve" a
dispute under the 5/8/98 LOU or 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding. (Aplt. Brief, 24-6).46
44

As the distinction is one without a difference, A&A simply attempts to distance
themselves from the absence of proof necessary to show a unilateral mistake.
45

See discussion, n.13, supra. The 7/1/98 Letter Agreement merely facilitated
Robena's payment to A&A aka Viron of $15,000 per month for services A&A were
already required to perform under the Consulting Agreement. Under the Release, the
settlement value to A&A was not just the new $60,000, but included their retaining
$180,000 previously paid under protest, all of which was deemed compensation under the
Consulting Agreement (for a total ransomed payment of $240,000 (i.e., $15,000 per
month from 5/98 to 3/99 plus a 6/29/00 $60,000 settlement payment)).
46

A&A try to contradict the terms of the Civil Action, and a fortiori, the Release,
by referring to a 3/15/00 letter from Steven Nash "acting on behalf o f CoBon, in which
he, a non-lawyer, references the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding and uses "supersedes" in
reference to the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement. While the letter was neither a formal discovery
response, nor reviewed by CoBon's counsel for accuracy, Mr. Nash qualified his
summary as a "brief initial response to questions regarding the extensive commercial
history. Mr. Nash stated the summary was not complete and not a substitute for
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1.

A Unilateral Mistake Does Not Relieve A&A From The Release.

A&A5s failure to make any "legal55 argument based on "unilateral55 mistake or
otherwise is understandable since the law does not support such and will not relieve A&A
of the consequences of filing the Civil Action. (See analysis in CoBon5 s Reply Memo., Sec.
B, pp. 28-34, incorporated by reference, R. 2211-06).
2.

Undisputed Facts Show A&A Were Not Mistaken.

A&A5s "factual55 argument that they "simply identified the wrong document as their
contract with Robena55 (Aplt. Brief, 46), is likewise untenable, where A&A aka Viron's
11/24/99 Complaint contains this verified allegation:
[Robena] entered into a Letter of Understanding ("LOU55) with [A&A aka Viron] on May
8, 1998 through its agent CoBon Energy, LLC ("CoBon55), whereby [A&A] would be
paid a consulting fee in the amount of $3,750.00 per week for its assistance in identifying,
evaluating and obtaining suitable coal fines to be purchased by CoBon, or its assigns. A
true and correct copy of the May 8,1998 letter is set forth on Exhibit "A55, attached hereto
and made a part hereof by reference.
(Verified Complaintf 3, Exh. D). Notwithstanding A&A5 s oversimplification, Mr. Rodak's
alleged "mistake55 was not limited to simply identifying the wrong document. Arguendo, the

"deposition testimony [that] may be necessary to tie down any details55, noting that
"obtaining detailed information from [witnesses] has been difficult"5 as such were not
being paid, and that "trying to summarize 'all verbal communications5 is not practical55.
CoBon5s legal duties under the 5/8/98 LOU were not modified by the unrelated use of the
word, as shown by A&A5s filing of the Civil Action based thereon, and indeed, the
Consulting Agreement could only be modified in writing. A&A5s spin on Mr. Nash5s
reference to "negotiations55 relating to the 5/8/98 LOU, 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding
and related 7/1/98 Letter Agreement is likewise unavailing to contradict the plain
assertions in the "verified55 Complaint and related Release. (See 3/15/00 Letter, p. 4, Tab
U; Motion to Dismiss - Omnibus Facts, % 3, R. 3518-3405).
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allegations show he also must have been "mistaken" when he referred to the date of the
5/8/98 LOU, described and incorporated the terms thereof, identified the parties thereto,
identified "CoBon" as Robena's "agent", and referenced coal fines to be purchased by
"CoBon". Of equal import is A&A aka Viron's repeated reference to, and attachment and
incorporation of, the invoices referencing the 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding with CoBon.
(Civil Action, Exh. D (Exh. D) and Exh M (referenced therein as 5/18/98 Letter of
Understanding (LOU)). While setting the parol evidence rule on its head, A&A's argument
that the Court should merely substitute the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement for the 5/8/98 LOU does
not solve the problem, as simplistically argued.47

47

A&A's argument that the 7/1/98 Letter Agreement was the only operative
agreement between the parties, also contradicts their sworn admissions, including
contemporaneous records. From 5/98 through the 11/24/99 filing of the verified
Complaint, A&A aka Viron referenced the 5/8/98 LOU and/or 5/19/98 Letter of
Understanding in multiple and regular written communications. Such references were
also included in 1) monthly status reports (see Exh. M and Supp. Memo., Sec. 3A, pp.
11-2, Exh. C thereto, R. 5501-5312), 2) monthly external invoices (id., Sec. 3B, pp. 12-4,
Exh. £>), 3) monthly internal invoices (id., Sec. 3C, pp. 14-5, Exh. F), 4) multiple letters
(id., Sec. 3D-3E, pp. 15-7, Exhs. E, G, H), and 5) "verified" invoices attached to the
verified Complaint, Exh. D).
As an example, in 9 "monthly reports" dated 5/98 thru 7/99, A&A refer to the 5/8/98
LOU and/or 5/19/98 "Letter of Understanding". In the final 7/1/99 report, they even say:
As you are aware, Viron has been providing sendees well beyond the scope of the
Letter of Understanding dated May 18, 1998, and now has become an integral key for
managing the various critical aspects of the Robena project. . . .
(Id., Sec. 3A, Exh. Q . While dates, topics, consultation, analyses, recommendations and
information in these documents vary, each directly and plainly refers to the operative
5/19/98 Letter of Understanding, "pursuant to which" Viron's services were provided.
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In addition to being barred by the parol evidence rule, A&A's arguments are simply
disingenuous. A&A's 8 year after-the-fact manufactured mistake (or "misidentification")
theory was briefed at length and, understandably, gained no traction given the plain terms of
the Release.

This Court should likewise disregard A&A's "mistake" argument as

contradicting the plain terms of the integrated Release, their own sworn admissions, and the
undisputed documents undermining such. {See n.47, supra).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees request the District Court's 3/1/10 Order be
affirmed on appeal.
Dated this { 3 Jay of December, 2010.
HILL, JOHNSON & HILL, L.C.

KIRTON & MCCONKIE

Anthony wVSchofield"

Despite A&A's argument of "mistake", A&A's testimony shows the 5/8/98 LOU was
never retracted {Id., Sec. 2) and the 5/8/98 LOU and 5/19/98 Letter of Understanding
were both considered to be operable by A&A. (Rodak Depo. Vol. 8, 1644, 1646-7, 166263, Exh. F; Visovsky Depo. Vol. 6, 1249-52, 1267-8, Exh. G).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
document to be served, by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Stephen Waldron, Esq.
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON
170 South Main Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dated this \2_ day of December, 2010.
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